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NOTES
SECTION 11 IN THE EXCHANGE OFFER SET-
TING: AN ANALYSIS OF FEIT v. LEASCO
DATA PROCESSING EQ UIPMENT CORP.
For four decades the issuance and trading of securities have been
guided by the single goal of "full and fair disclosure."' This objective,
supplemented by proscriptions against fraud, rests on twin underpin-
nings: the effective operation of a free market for securities demands
equal access by buyers and sellers to all information material to an
intelligent investment decision;2 and the degree of exposure to the
"electric light" of publicity is directly proportional to the deterrence
of fraudulent or manipulative practices.' The essence of the securi-
ties disclosure scheme, though, is the elusive concept of "material-
ity"; that which is not essential to an informed investor decision need
not be disclosed.' The task of determining what information is mate-
rial (and in what contexts it is material) has fallen to several actors
in the securities scheme; their independent efforts have superimposed
upon the skeletal framework of the Securities Act of 1933 a volumi-
nous, and at times discordant, body of federal securities law. Con-
gress, by enactment of subsequent legislation,5 has both broadened
I. Preamble, Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). The operative provisions
of the 1933 Act are codified in 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATION IS USED IN THIS NOTE:
Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L.
REV. I (1969) [hereinafter cited as Folk].
2. See generally Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171
(1933); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607 (1964).
3. Brandeis emphasized the deterrent effect of the disclosure policy in his famous statement:
"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." L.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933).
4. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), prescribing civil liability
if
any part of the registration statement. . . contained an untrue statement of a material
fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading . . ..
The statute also authorizes suit by buyers of such securities against certain parties who are
afforded limited defenses based upon the degree of care exercised in their involvement in the
registration process.
5. Major legislation includes the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
(1970) and the Williams Act Amendments, Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat.
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the scope of the original Act and granted to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission authority to build upon the statutory frame-
work through its rule-making powers, its administration of the regis-
tration system, and its active participation in the enforcement pro-
cess. Paralleling this expansion has been the often volatile judicial
construction of the statutes and rules promulgated thereunder,'
spurred forward by the increasing ingenuity of the securities plain-
tiffs' bar. This multiplicity of input 7 has rendered extremely difficult
the realization of what must be a goal of any legislative system em-
bodying regulatory and judicial sanctions-that of predictability and
uniformity of result.
A notable example of judicial expansion of the securities laws was
Judge McLean's exhaustive opinion in Escott v. BarChris Construc-
tion Corp.' BarChris Construction Corporation, engaged primarily in
the construction of bowling centers,9 was swept forward in the rapid
expansion of bowling as a leisure sport in the 1950's.10 The company
publicly offered its common stock in 1959, and in 1961 sold
$3,500,000 in subordinated convertible debentures." However, over-
expansion in the industry caused defaults by its customers, forcing
BarChris into bankruptcy in October, 1962 and subsequently into
default on its debenture obligations. Purchasers of the BarChris de-
454; Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497. Additional legislation, directed
to more specific concerns, includes the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb
(1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79z (1970); Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1970); and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80b (1970).
6. See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967) (the "purchase or sale" requirement of rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972),
was eased to encompass the issuance of shares to be exchanged in a merger); Vine v. Beneficial
Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (the minority shareholder
in a short-form merger was held to be a "forced seller" for lob-5 purposes). For critical analysis
of judicial decisions broadening the sweep of rule 1Ob-5, see Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development
of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185
(1964).
7. Professor Bromberg's novel examination of the 1968 tender offer legislation employs an
interest analysis which suggests the difficulty-and the necessity-of balancing divergent inter-
ests in securities regulation. Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest
Analysis, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 613 (1970).
8. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
9. Id. at 653. As time passed, BarChris became increasingly active in the operation of
repossessed bowling centers. Id. at 670, 676.
10. Actually, BarChris installed only three percent of the lanes built, with two larger
companies dominating the industry. Nonetheless, in the five years ending in 1960, annual net
sales skyrocketed from $800,000 to $9,165,000. Id. at 653.
11. A third attempt to issue additional common stock in 1962 fell through. Id. at 654.
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bentures brought a class action, alleging numerous misrepresen-
tations and omissions of material facts in the registration statement
in violation of section 11 of the 1933 Act.12 Judge McLean concluded
that a number of alleged misstatements and omissions had in fact
violated the statute and thus imposed liability upon Bar Chris and its
directors, the underwriters, and the auditor.13
Most commentators agree that the most significant aspect of the
BarChris holding is its extensive analysis of the section 11 "due dili-
gence" defenses, 4 which are available to all defendants other than the
issuer. 5 The statutory defenses are two pronged, requiring a more
stringent standard for non-expertised portions of the registration
statement16 as opposed to those purported to be made on the author-
ity of an expert. In order to avoid liability as to the former, the
defendant must have made a "reasonable investigation" upon which
his reasonable grounds for belief in the accuracy of the document are
based. 7 It is here that Judge McLean's construction of the statute is
most telling, particularly his designation of only the auditors as ex-
perts, excluding underwriters and attorneys;" his functional delinea-
12. Securities Act of 1933 § I1, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). See note 4 supra.
13. 283 F. Supp. at 654-703. Five directors were also officers and therefore "insiders,"
while four were "outsiders": an attorney in the company's law firm, a partner of the lead
underwriter, a banker, and an engineer. The ill-fated latter three were all elected to the BarChris
board one month before the registration statement became effective. 283 F. Supp. at 652.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1970).
15. Professor Folk's analysis of the BarChris case is the most comprehensive study thus
far published. See also Wyant & Smith, BarChris: A Revaluation of Prospectus Liability?, 3
GA. L. REV. 122 (1968); BarChris: A Dialogue on a Bad Case Making Hard Law, 57 GEO.
L.J. 221 (1968); The BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 523 (1969); Comment,
BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1411 (1968); Comment, The Expanding
Liability of Securities Underwriters: Front BarChris to Globus, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1191; Com-
ment, BarChris: Easing the Burden of "Due Diligence" Under Section II, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
735 (1969); Note, Escott v. BarChris: "Reasonable Investigation" and Prospectus Liability
Under Section II of the Securities Act of 1933, 82 HARV. L. REV. 908 (1969); 21 STAN. L.
REV. 171 (1968).
16. Non-expertised portions of a registration statement are those "not purporting to be
made on the authority of an expert, and not purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report
or valuation of an expert, and not purporting to be made on the authority of a public offi-
cial. ... Securities Act of 1933, § I l(b)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1970).
17. Section 1 I(c) defines the reasonable investigation standard as "that required of a pru-
dent man in the management of his own property." Id. § 77k(c).
18. Judge McLean held unreasonable the defendants' assertion that "the entire registration
statement is expertised because some lawyer prepared it .... " 283 F. Supp. at 683. See also
Folk 58; Comment, 68 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 15, at 1414. Especially significant is Judge
McLean's incorporation of the standards of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants, Folk 60-61, into the "due diligence" standard as applicable to the auditor-expert. Since
the Peat, Marwick accountant's S-I review failed to "come up to that standard," the defense
was not available. 283 F. Supp. at 703.
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tion of the duty of investigation as applied to insiders, 9 outsiders,"0
and specialist directors;21 and, indirectly, his unavoidable considera-
tion of the degree to which the duties of reasonable investigation and
belief may be met by delegation or reliance.22
BarChris unleashed shock waves of self-examination motivated,
at least from the cynic's point of view, by a desire not to be caught
making the same mistake.23 Presumably, practice among issuers,
underwriters, accountants and their supportive legal personnel has
been tailored to comply with the BarChris mandate;24 however, as
with many precedent-shattering pronouncements in the law, the
BarChris opinion left important questions unanswered.
Because the alleged misrepresentations and omissions in BarChris
were so egregious, Judge McLean had no cause to refine the defini-
tion of "materiality." The need for a more precise definition is
acute, however. Unless he knows which facts are so essential to a
particular investment decision that omission of a single one will trig-
ger liability, a potential defendant cannot act with confidence that his
disclosures are adequate. His confusion is compounded by the explicit
disclosure requirements of some sections of the federal securities
19. The five inside directors in BarChris were also all officers and, with one exception,
members of the executive committee; all but one failed completely to meet the due diligence
defense. It should be noted that insiders apart from directors are potentially, but not automati-
cally, liable. Folk 25.
20. Professor Folk defines "outsiders" as "directors who are not also officers of the corpo-
ration or who otherwise have no specific and intimate relationship to the corporation which
would afford them either actual knowledge of corporate affairs or such ready access thereto to
confer a right to such information." Id. at 26. See also Comment, 117 U. PA. L. REV., supra
note 15, at 739-41; Comment, 68 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 15, at 1411-14.
21. Professor Folk uses the term "specialist director" to designate one upon whom the
court's judgment may fall harder "because of his particular function in the corporation...
his professional knowledge or skill .. .or the fact that he participates in the registration
process not only as a director but also in some additional capacity." Folk 33. Such a classifica-
tion could encompass the attorney, underwriter, or section I 1 "expert" himself. Id. at 33-42,
22. The facts of BarChris force this consideration, though not expressly. For example,
attention is directed to reliance by directors on corporate documents or reports. Professor Folk
expands upon this problem. Id. at 64-72. See also Comment, 1969 DUKE L.J., supra note 15,
at 1209-16.
23. The commentary on BarChris is legion. See, e.g., authorities cited at note 15 supra.
24. The concerned commentary of the securities bar certainly indicates increased diligence
as a result of BarChris. See, e.g., Israels, Preparation of Registration Statement: Issuer's
Counsel-Advice to My Client, 24 Bus. LAW. 537 (1969).
25. The "average prudent investor" standard of the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(l) (1972),
was sufficient when viewed in light of the overstatement of gross profit, sales, orders on hand,
understatement of contingent liabilities, and failure to disclose facts as to officer loans, custom-




scheme," as well as by the knowledge that he is as likely to be
penalized for saying too much as for saying too littleY.2
Another issue not considered in BarChris was the proper measure
of damages to be awarded when the fraud occurred in a falling mar-
ket. In such a situation it is clear that the plaintiff would have suf-
fered some losses on his investments which could not be attributed
to the misdeeds of the defendant. Although section 11 denies recovery
for losses not resulting from misrepresentation or omission,2 the
defendant's burden of proof in such cases has been described by
commentators as "impossible. 21 9
The remainder of this Note will discuss the questions unanswered
in BarChris. Particular emphasis will be placed on the recent district
court holding in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.,3
a decision notable for its thorough-and frequently novel-analysis
of materiality and the measure of damages, as well as for its refine-
ment of the BarChris treatment of section 11 defenses.
Feit v. Leasco: FACTS AND HOLDING
Any discussion of the Leasco case must be prefaced by reference
to the dynamic ascendancy in the financial community of the "growth
cult." From the mid-1950's through the 1960's, investors "paid more
and more attention to the fundamental competitive position of indus-
tries and companies, to changing processes and technologies, and to
earnings projections over an extended time horizon."'3' This passion
for performance was epitomized by the conglomerate movement,
fueled by the use in takeover bids of convertible securities, which
leveraged the earnings potential of the conqueror by absorption of the
immediate earnings performance of the target while postponing a
proportionate expansion of the parent's equity base. The investment
community and acquisition-minded management would find ex-
tremely lucrative, for example, the potential leverage accruing from
26. See, e.g., the disclosure requirements enacted by the Williams Act. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 §§ 13(d), 14(d)-(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d)-(e) (1970). See note 84 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 77-80 infra.
28. Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (e), 15 U.S.C. 77k(e) (1970).
29. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 810
(1968). See notes 124-26 infra and accompanying text.
30. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
31. Stott, The Changing Face of Corporate Finance, THE MORGAN GUARANTY SURVEY 3
(Oct. 1967), reprinted in W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1636 (4th ed.
1969).
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the combination of an aggressive parent in the electronic data pro-
cessing field with a fire and casualty company whose estimated
$ 100,000,000 in liquid assets could be stripped away for more produc-
tive utilization by a holding company manipulated by the parent.
One such combination was inspired by two studies of the fire and
casualty insurance industry which were made available to Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corporation. One study envisioned a
broad-based, financial services holding company making use of the
tremendous capital resources of the subsidiary insurance company. 2
The second report, prepared internally by Leasco,33 analyzed the
advantages of such an acquisition, using Reliance Insurance Com-
pany l as a model. Crucial to such an acquisition was the desire of
Leasco to control the tremendous surplus capital reserves of Reliance
known in the industry as "surplus surplus." Essentially, surplus sur-
plus consists of "the highly liquid assets of an insurance company
which can be utilized in non-regulated enterprises." 3 To be of such
use, however, surplus surplus must be segregated from the insurance
assets subject to state regulation; therefore, the holding company
concept or a viable alternative was critical to Leasco's plans.3
32. The Netter Report, written in August, 1967, was commissioned by Leasco and devel-
oped by Edward Netter of Carter, Berlind & Weill. Another report prepared by the New York
State Insurance Department resulted in widespread awareness of the concept. See N.Y. INS,
DEP'T, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANIES 43 (1968).
33. The Gibbs Report, prepared by Leasco's Vice President for Corporate Planning, ex-
panded upon the Netter Report's holding company concept. In Gibbs's opinion, the principal
advantages to Leasco of such an acquisition included: (1) great increase in earnings per share,
(2) tremendous growth potential of the financial services holding company, (3) larger capital
input for Leasco's computer leasing, (4) aggressive acquisition and investment on the part of
the holding company and (5) a foothold in the financial services industry of the future. Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 3 at 1-2, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
34. Reliance was a fire and casualty company subject to regulation by the Pennsylvania
Insurance Commissioner.
35. 332 F. Supp. at 551. More specifically, surplus surplus is that amount above and beyond
the surplus required by regulation. That is, an amount
that will be adequate to cover for a reasonable period of time any losses and expenses
larger than those predicted and any declines in asset values, including all chance varia-
tions in the crucial factors of the operation. Id. at 550-51, quoting N.Y. INS. DEP'T,
supra note 32, at 43.
The two reports varied in their estimates of the surplus surplus available. The Netter Report
set the figure at $80,000,000 as of the end of 1966, while Gibbs's estimates were $125,000,000
as of June 30, 1967 and $100,000,000 by the end of the year,
36. Since insurance companies are often forbidden to engage in noninsurance business
activities, surplus surplus must be separated from the regulated insurance operation with its
concomitant restrictions.
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The first concrete manifestation of Leasco's interest was its sys-
tematic purchases of Reliance stock." Reliance responded defen-
sively in a vaguely-worded letter from its president, Roberts, to the
shareholders intended to "forestall a takeover bid."3 After an un-
fruitful meeting in early June between representatives of the two
companies, Leasco announced an offer to exchange a debenture-
warrant package for each two shares of Reliance common. 9 Reli-
ance countered by writing a letter to shareholders counseling deliber-
ation, and by refusing to cooperate with Leasco's numerous requests
for assistance and verification in the preparation of the preliminary
registration statement." The attitude of the Reliance management
remained hostile through the month of July. Reliance filed a deter-
rent lawsuit against Leasco and, in a letter from Roberts, strongly
recommended shareholder rejection of the offer 41-actions which the
court found probative of the Roberts group's preparation "to employ
a full panoply of defensive techniques in an attempt to bust the ex-
change offer."42 At the end of July, however, the Reliance manage-
ment experienced a change of heart when Leasco modified the origi-
nal proposal to include substantial personal benefit to the Reliance
group. In return, the -Reliance management was to withdraw its active
opposition to the exchange and to assist in establishing a Leasco-
controlled holding company which was to be guaranteed access to the
surplus surplus but which agreed not to interfere with the insurance
aspects of Reliance. 3 This agreement was reduced to writing on
37. By April 3, 1968, Leasco owned 132,000 shares (around 3%) of Reliance's outstanding
common, valued at over $4,000,000. 332 F. Supp. at 554.
38. Although the letter made reference to Reliance's own plans to utilize surplus surplus
through a holding company, it was admittedly only a "public relations maneuver." Id.
39. Leasco offered one warrant and one convertible debenture having a principal amount
of $110 and annual interest of $4.00 in exchange for each two shares of Reliance common. It is
crucial to note that during the week immediately prior to this announcement, a partner of
White, Weld & Co., the lead underwriter, was named as a director on the Leasco board. See
note 120 infra and accompanying text.
40. The registration statement covered the Leasco common into which the debentures were
to be converted. 332 F. Supp. at 555.
41. The court found the July 23 shareholder letter significant for its insight into the depth
of opposition to the offer. 332 F. Supp. at 556. In addition to enumerating the disadvantages
inherent in the Leasco deal, Roberts tacitly suggested that outside interest from a number of
sources might produce a more attractive offer if the Leasco exchange fell through. Id.
42. Id. A late July meeting between the two groups was described by Leasco's chief execu-
tive officer as "cold." Id. at 555.
43. In return for Reliance's cooperation and announced approval of the exchange, Leasco
promised to maintain a majority of the existing board in office for five years. Roberts was
personally promised that he could retain his position as a director and chief executive officer
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August 1, commencing an "effective working relationship between
what was to be parent and subsidiary."44 Leasco, sensing success,
altered the offer package to preferred stock and warrants, while Reli-
ance, in a letter to shareholders, dutifully withdrew its opposition to
the takeover, failing to mention that the shift to preferred stock made
the offer less beneficial from a tax standpoint than the first offer."
On August 19, the registration statement became effective-without
express reference either to "surplus surplus" or to Leasco's contem-
plated use thereof in the holding company context. The offer was
overwhelmingly successful; seventy-two percent of the shares were
tendered by September 13. Subsequently, the offer was extended four
times, with the increasingly enthusiastic cooperation of Roberts, and
finally terminated on November 1.46
A class action suit was brought against Leasco, three directors
and the two dealer-managers4 7 on behalf of all shareholders of Reli-
ance who had exchanged their shares between August 19 and Novem-
ber 1, 1968.4 Plaintiffs alleged material misrepresentations and omis-
sions in violation of sections 11, 12(2), and 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933,11 sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,50 and rule lOb-5. 5' Specifically, the complaint alleged that
as well as a directorship with Leasco; his salary was to be increased and he was granted options
to purchase Leasco shares, while at the same time he was assured that his name would not be
used in the Leasco registration statement. In return, Leasco was guaranteed majority control
of the holding company to be formed, a veto over extraordinary acts of Reliance, and a
Reliance dividend equal to that which Leasco would be obligated to pay upon the tendered
shares. Id. at 556-57.
44. Id. at 556.
45. Id. at 558. The original offer would subject the tenderor to tax on installments as he
realized gain; the preferred offer was immediately taxable. There is language in the opinion
which clearly regards this action as a breach of fiduciary duty on Roberts' part. See Id.
46. Two postscripts to these events deserve mention. In January, 1969, Leasco filed a
registration statement and prospectus which, in discussing the recently-acquired insurance
company, expressly estimated Reliance's surplus surplus at $125,000,000. Id. at 560. Second,
Reliance did declare a special dividend of $39,394,369 in August, 1969 as the ultimate vehicle
for transferring surplus surplus to Leasco. The court took judicial notice of the 1969 stock
market decline as the primary explanation for the decline in Reliance's surplus surplus to less
than one-third of the original estimate. Id. at 586.
47. The three directors also served respectively as Leasco's chief executive officer, presi-
dent, and general counsel, the latter also as a partner in the law firm which represented Leasco.
All three were held to be "insiders." Id. at 575-76. The chief underwriter was White, Weld &
Co., the other dealer-manager was Lehman Brothers.
48. Dudley Feit, the named representative of the class of aggrieved shareholders, tendered
his shares on October 14, 1968. Id. at 560.
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2), 77q(a) (1970).
50. Id. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e) (1970).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
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Leasco had failed to disclose an estimate of the surplus surplus of
Reliance and to fully reveal its "intentions" to reorganize Reliance
or to otherwise remove its surplus surplus in a manner other than
through a holding company.52 The defendants responded that the
omissions were not material because an estimate of surplus surplus
would have made the offer more attractive. Further, the defendants
argued that not only would inclusion of such a figure have been
"bullish" and thus proscribed but also that an accurate estimate was
impossible because Reliance's financial data, its management's own
estimate, and the opinion of the insurance commissioner were una-
vailable. Finally, the defense contended that other plans for removal
of the surplus surplus were merely contingent at the time of the tender
offer.13 The court held that an estimate of the amount of the surplus
surplus was indeed material and available to Leasco but that "prelim-
inary contingency planning" concerning its use need not have been
included in the prospectus. 4
After discussing the issue of materiality, Judge Weinstein consid-
ered the due diligence defenses of the defendants and held liable the
issuer and three directors-two "insiders" and one "attorney direc-
tor." In applying the "independent verification" test prescribed in
BarChris, Judge Weinstein looked to each director's involvement, his
expertise, and his access to the pertinent information needed to verify
representations in the registration statement.5 Rejecting the defense
that data was unavailable due to Reliance's hostility, the court found
critical the directors' knowledge of the August 1 rapprochement be-
tween Reliance's board and Leasco.5 s The court further concluded
that "adequate inquiry" demanded that the defendants attempt to
calculate the surplus figure even without Reliance's cooperation. As
to the underwriters, the court held that they "just barely" established
due diligence defenses despite their knowledge of the August 1 bar-
gain.58
52. The only reference in the prospectus concerning the surplus surplus concept neither
mentioned an estimate nor suggested the importance thereof to Leasco. The prospectus echoed
what it referred to as Reliance's intent to form a holding company and announced Leasco's
intent to promote the realization thereof, with Reliance providing "the maximum amount of
funds legally available . See the excerpt from the prospectus at 332 F. Supp. at 552.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 568.
55. Id. at 577-78. See note 99 infra and accompanying text.
56. 332 F. Supp. at 580.
57. Id. at 581.
58. Id. at 582.
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Liability having been found, Judge Weinstein turned to the ques-
tion of appropriate damages.59 In this portion of the opinion, he
attempted to perform the "impossible" feat of extracting the effects
of the market decline from the total losses suffered by the plaintiff.
His analysis, which in all likelihood will be heavily relied on by future
defendants, will be discussed in greater detail in a later section of this
Note.60
Analysis of Leasco
Materiality. Liability under section 11 arises only when the omis-
sion or misrepresentation is "material."'" Although the SEC has at-
tempted to provide guidance in the application of the "materiality"
standard, its rule 405, defining as "material" those matters of which
an "average" prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed,"2 has
only served as a springboard from which courts have leaped in quest
of a more workable standard. That search has been complicated by
the reappearance of the materiality standard in a number of the other
antifraud sections, notably in sections 12(2) and 17(a)(2) of the 1933
Act, as well as rule lOb-5, and the proxy and tender offer provisions
of the 1934 Act.63The result has been a semantic merry-go-round, a
loosely-veiled attempt by the courts to pay lip service to some objec-
tive test while, actually, the standard demands a subjective evaluation
to determine what financial incentives motivate the elusive "average"
investor.64 The quest for such a uniform standard should originate
within the individual context of the particular securities setting with
the ultimate decision tailored accordingly. Thus, what is material to
a purchaser of an original offering might be different in an exchange
offer, a proxy contest, or in a corporation's decision to disclose or
suppress intra-corporate information. 5
59. Id. at 584.
60. See text accompanying notes 123-36 infra.
61. See note 4 supra.
62. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1972).
63. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
64. Professor Bromberg's definition of materiality in the lob-5 context attests to this se-
mantic dilemma. He suggests that "[s]ome sort of reasonable man, objective test of investment
judgment, intrinsic value, or . . . significant market effect is appropriate." A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIES LAW-FRAUD § 8.3 at 199 (1967). Bromberg concedes that "[a] certain amount
of subjectivity of this sort affords desirable flexibility." Id. at 201. Contrast his treatment in
disclosure cases: Bromberg, Disclosure Programs for Publicly Held Companies-A Practical
Guide, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1139.
65. The SEC, speaking through its General Counsel, has given tacit recognition to this
"functional" approach but concludes: "No very useful purpose would be served by attempting
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In BarChris, Judge McLean applied a cursory but wholly ade-
quate test of materiality to the simple original issue purchase context:
material matters are those "which such an investor needs to know
before he can make an intelligent, informed decision whether or not
to buy the security," 66-that is, "facts which have an important bear-
ing upon the nature or condition of the issuing corporation . . .,.
Since it refers to decisions to purchase and to facts about the issuer,
the BarChris standard is only indirectly applicable to an investor's
decision in response to an exchange offer to give up the stock of the
target company. In Leasco, Judge Weinstein clearly recognized this
deficiency6" and turned instead both to judicial treatment of the con-
cept in other settings69 and to his own ingenuity in fashioning yet
another rendering of "materiality." According to Judge Weinstein:
to determine whether these somewhat varying formulations come down to essentially the same
thing." Loomis, The S.E.C. Looks at BarChris, 24 Bus. LAW. 693, 695 (1969); See also Alberg,
SEC Disclosure Requirements for Corporations, 26 Bus. LAW. 1223, 1225 (1971).
Bromberg apparently would carry this functional approach even further and look to the
individual motive in a deliberate deception or to the subjective relations between parties in
direct personal transactions. A. BROMBERG, supra note 64, § 8.3 at 199.
66. 283 F. Supp. at 681.
67. Id. (emphasis added). Judge McLean found still relevant the precedent of an early
Securities Act case in which a material fact was defined as one which may have "deterred or
tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing the securities in question."
Charles A. Howard, I S.E.C. 6, 8 (1934).
68. "BarChris cannot be read as permitting exclusion of important facts merely because
they involve the condition of the company being taken over rather than the issuer since these
facts will bear on the relative value of the issuer's securities." 332 F. Supp. at 569.
69. Judge Weinstein saw the need for some "probability" that the investor's decision
"would" be affected by disclosure-a test of "fairly high probability." Id. at 569-70. Several
decisions have used the same formulation. See, e.g., SEC v. Great American Indus. Inc., 407
F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969) (10b-5 nondisclosure suit involving
press releases and SEC report forms); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (insider purchase on undisclosed information; suit under 10b-5).
Other formulations have used "have a significant propensity to affect," Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (proxy contest); "might well have acted otherwise," Chasins
v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir. 1971) (nondisclosure of market making
activity of brokerage firm in sales to customers); or "may affect," SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (disclosure obligation of insiders).
The commentators have added to the flow of "materiality" definitions. See, e.g., Fleischer,
Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1289 (1965); Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-
)OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1145 (1950).
Noting that these formulations, standing alone, "fail to prescribe a precise standard," Judge
Weinstein observed that they evidence a broadening trend in the definition of materiality, thus
"raising the requirement of disclosure. ... 332 F. Supp. at 571. See also A. BROMBERG
supra note 64, § 8.3 at 199.
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"A fact is proved to be material when it is more probable than not
that a significant number of traders would have wanted to know it
... ."70 Since a prospectus is held to a high legal standard, Judge
Weinstein stated: "Anything in the order of 10% of either the number
of potential traders or those potentially making 10% of the volume
of sales would seem to more than suffice."'" Thus, a single buyer of
ten percent of the issue could render a fact "material" by his desire
to know it. Since the court must still speculate as to what the investor
would "want to know," however, this definition, if left solely to the
intuition of the court, appears to remain circular.
Judge Weinstein attempted to break the circuitous bonds of his
own test by proposing that potential litigants submit statistical sur-
veys to guide the court's intuition. In future litigation, investor desire
to know specific facts could be demonstrated by "mathematical mod-
els buttressed by valid sampling techniques for determining trader
reactions . . ". Apart from questions of economic and evidentiary
feasibility of extrajudicial surveys, this technique is open to serious
challenge on the ground that it substitutes the man-in-the-street's
uninformed reaction for the court's application of the SEC standard
embodied in rule 405.
Since the parties were not prepared to litigate the case armed with
such data, Judge Weinstein fell back upon more traditional and safer
ground, analyzing materiality by a non-quantitative "hypothetical
reasonably prudent shareholder" test: "A fact is 'material' . . .
whenever a rational connection exists between its disclosure and a
viable alternative course of action by any appreciable number of in-
vestors." 3 Having discussed at great length the "preliminary" quest
for a standard, Judge Weinstein concluded that the estimate of sur-
plus surplus was so significant "that under any test proposed it is
material."74 The court listed several reasons why knowledge of sur-
.plus surplus might have altered the investment decisions of the Re-
liance shareholders." For example, the shareholders could not ade-
70. 332 F. Supp. at 571 (emphasis added). Note that the opinion adopts the more stringent
"would" approach as opposed to "could" or "might." See note 63 supra. Cf. Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), where the Supreme Court applied the "might
have considered important" standard to a lob-5 case. Id. at 154.
71. 332 F. Supp. at 571.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 572.
75. Id. at 573-75.
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quately assess the extent of investor interest in Leasco (particularly
of institutional investors with access to the fire and casualty studies)
in order to decide whether to hold out for a better offer. Further,
they were denied the benefit of market reaction to such disclosure,
consequent price appreciation, 76 and probably were deterred from
the option of holding their shares in pursuance of the original Re-
liance proposal to form its own holding company.
In finding that an estimate of surplus surplus was material, how-
ever, the court may have given insufficient attention to the defen-
dants' contention that inclusion of such a figure would be purely
speculative and hence contrary to SEC and stock exchange policy.
77
Such rules have presented management with a disclosure dilemma:
it is liable for failure to disclose projections if material, yet it is
equally liable if projections, once made, are either overly-optimistic
or too conservative. 71 Since any estimate of surplus surplus necessar-
ily would have incorporated an estimate of "specific future market
values" of the securities held in the Reliance investment portfolio,79
it is not difficult to understand Leasco's reluctance to walk a chalk
line so narrowly drawn. That such an estimate would have been truly
speculative was borne out by the ultimate value of the surplus surplus
available for distribution-as a result of the 1969 market decline,
Leasco was able to siphon off less than $40,000,000 as a special cash
dividend. If Leasco had included its own internally-generated approx-
imation (roughly $100-125,000,000) in the registration statement, it
76. The presumption is that knowledge of surplus surplus and its potential use would have
forced the market to revalue Reliance shares, thus forestalling the exchange until Leasco's offer
was made more attractive. The court rejected defendants' argument that the premium offered
was so attractive that disclosure would have been of no consequence. Id. at 572.
77. Projections in proxy statements are limited by the suggestion, which presumably now
has been incorporated into exchange offer disclosure requirements, that "predictions as to
specific future market values" may be misleading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, Note 9 (1972). The
New York Stock Exchange expresses a similar policy:
Any projections of financial data, for instance, should be soundly based, appropriately
qualified, conservative and factual. Excessive or misleading conservatism should be
avoided. Procedure for Public Release of Information, NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-
22 (1968).
Professor Manne discusses at length the background of SEC policy in the area. Manne,
Accounting and Administrative Law Aspects of Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 15 N.Y.L.F.
304, 314-27 (1969). See also WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 105-12 (C. Israels & G. Duff,
eds. 1962); Soloman, Pro Forma Statements, Projections and the S.E.C., 24 Bus. LAW. 389
(1969).
78. Alberg, supra note 65, at 1230. According to Professor Bromberg, projections will be
judged by "whether the forecast had a reasonable basis, both in fact and in method of prepara-
tion, when made." A. BROMBERG, supra note 64, § 7.1 at 148.
79. See note 77 supra.
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conceivably would have been liable to the same plaintiffs for a mate-
rial misrepresentation when it ultimately realized only one-third of
the original estimate. Since the securities statutes arm the plaintiff
with such a two-edged sword, the only safe avenue open to manage-
ment, when in possession of a projection presumably material, is full
but conservative disclosure, affirmatively qualified to take into ac-
count future variables of both favorable and unfavorable conse-
quence. 0
Leasco expressly held that the only actionable omission was the
80. A recent decision in the proxy setting further clouds the judicial gloss imposed upon
the disclosure of projections and the valuation of assets or securities material to the transaction.
In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), the full disclosure
mandate of rule I 0b-5 and Texas Gulf Sulphur collided head-on with traditional SEC conserva-
tive accounting rules which have insisted on asset valuation at historical cost as opposed to
current market value.
The complaint in Gerstle alleged insufficient disclosure in a proxy solicitation seeking
approval of a statutory merger of a fifty percent owned company, General, into its dominant
shareholder, Gamble-Skogmo. Prior to the merger, General was eliminating its billboard ad-
vertising units, which, while unprofitably operated, nonetheless were worth substantially more
than their book values. The alleged omissions, upheld by the court, included a failure to disclose
the company's own appraisal of the fair market value of these assets, 298 F. Supp. at 92, and
to state expressly the company's intent to sell those assets immediately after merger, id. As a
result, the court held that the exchange ratio based on historical values was misleading and thus
deprived General shareholders of their undiluted share of the gains on the subsequent sales.
One writer finds critical the SEC's reversal of its long-standing position on asset valuation; the
Commission's amicus brief asserted that "a failure to disclose appreciation of assets may under
some circumstances be actionable quite apart from any specific intention to realize that appre-
ciation." Manne, supra note 77, at 308. Although Gerstle, unlike Leasco, involved plans to sell
physical assets to third-party buyers, the two cases provide striking parallels in their holdings
as to the necessity of disclosure of asset approximations at fair market values by the acquiring
corporation in a merger regardless of clear intent to liquidate the same. The cases thus forebode
considerable future dispute over disclosure of assets valuation in exchange offer transactions,
Leasco and Gerstle bring into serious question the continuing precedential validity of the
decision in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), 135 F. Supp. 176
(D. Del. 1955), modified on other grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). In Speed, the court
held that no cause of action under rule lOb-5 existed for failure to disclose appreciation in
inventory values, since such information was readily available to the market; however, Transa-
merica's failure to disclose its intent to liquidate Axton-Fisher, the holder of the inventory, was
a material omission.
The defense of "market knowledge" which was successful in Speed was avoided by the court
in Gerstle despite acknowledgement that the market price probably reflected the knowledge of
appreciation of the assets of General. The defendants were thus precluded from showing wide
dissemination of such information and its potential relevance to the issue of damages and the
overall fairness of the exchange. Professor Manne finds this to be a serious but understandable
weakness in the court's approach. Manne, supra note 77, at 313. The parallel to Leasco is
obvious; the Gerstle rationale would deny to defendants the opportunity to establish that the
market was fully cognizant of the importance of surplus surplus because of the widespread
dissemination of the fire and casualty study reports.
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failure to include an estimate of surplus surplus.81 Thus, the case
could be cited as support for permitting nondisclosure in a registra-
tion statement of the plans which the successful corporation has for
the target, at least where those plans are merely contingent or ex-
pressed in the alternative. It should be noted, however, that a mere
numerical approximation of surplus surplus, in the absence of either
knowledge of its legal availability or its most probable utilization, is
a meaningless input into the investor's decision to swap; rather, in the
court's own words, the investor should be told "what the deal is all
about. '82 It has been said that: "[t]he disclosure of plans seems to run
counter to a powerful SEC tradition prohibiting projections and other
references to the future. '8 3 But to conclude that Leasco need not
have disclosed the contingent plans which were the sole motivation
of the offer and which would lead inevitably to the separation of the
surplus surplus from Reliance's insurance business would raise more
serious conflicts with other sections of the securities laws and chal-
lenge the underlying disclosure philosophy of securities regulation.
In a strict sense, this portion of the Leasco holding has been
mooted by the Williams Act and its amendments to sections 13 and
14 of the 1934 Act.84 Prospectuses used in exchange offers must now
disclose the same information to offerees as that which is required in
81. 332 F. Supp. at 575, 588.
82. Id. at 549.
83. Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 459, 501-02 (1969).
84. The Williams Act, as originally enacted, Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82
Stat. 454 and subsequently amended, Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497,
requires filing and disclosure primarily in acquisition of equity securities by 5% or more holders
in takeover bids via cash or exchange offers. For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the
Act, see Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-Growing Pains?, Some
Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. L. REV. 654 (1971); Sommer,
Tender Offers, P-H SEC. REG. 1101 (1971).
Prior to the Williams Act provisions, the primary protection afforded offerees was the
antifraud prohibition of rule l0b-5. Under the Williams Act, however, cash tender offers were
made subject to express disclosure requirements, including a parallel antifraud provision, by
the expansion of sections 13 and 14 of the 1934 Act. Under the 1968 scheme, the 14(d)
requirements were waived if the offeror proposed the deal by means of a 1933 Act registration
statement; presumably, the Leasco registration statement, filed July 8, 1968, was exempted
from the more stringent requirements. The Leasco court makes no reference to these require-
ments since the complaint alleged violation only of the antifraud provisions of 14(e). This
exemption of 14(d)(8)(A) was eliminated by the 1970 amendments (the major significance of
which was the inclusion of stock exchange offers within the disclosure requirement of section
14(d)). The 1970 amendments thus avoided the possibility raised by Leasco that an issuer in
an exchange might avoid the disclosure of certain plans mandated by the exchange offer




cash tender offers.85 When the purpose of the offer is to acquire
control, the offer must disclose
any plans or proposals which the purchasers may have to liquidate the issuer,
to sell its assets or to merge it with any other persons, or to make any other
major change in its business or corporate structure . . .8
Although Leasco in 1968 was subject to the disclosure requirements
applicable to registration statements under the 1933 Act, the issue it
raises for tender offers-the extent of the requirement to disclose
"plans or proposals"-remains an omnipresent and perplexing prob-
lem. Although there is at present no indication as to the degree of
detail necessary under the Williams Act, one commentator has con-
cluded that, despite the offeror's uncertainty, he "must say what the
plans are, or that there are none.'8 7 In Leasco, therefore, the sum-
mary dismissal of the allegation that the registration statement omit-
ted disclosure of contingent plans for utilization of surplus surplus
other than the holding company concept might, if reheard under the
Williams Act requirements, be reversed.
Not surprisingly, the uncertainty as to the extent of Williams Act
disclosure requirements has led to litigation. As in Leasco, the cases
have centered on the degree of certainty required before plans or
proposals need be disclosed. The Supreme Court's consideration of
the problem came indirectly in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,88 in
which the Court implicitly recognized as a material omission in a
proxy solicitation the failure to disclose plans for the survivor of the
merger to assume obligations incurred in purchases of the target's
stock. 9
85. Under the 1968 scheme, it was unlawful for any person to make a tender offer if he
would then be the owner of ten percent (now five) of the class of securities unless he first filed
a statement containing the information requested in section 13(d). The 1970 amendments
brought exchange offers within the same dictates. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.434(b) (1972). The
items to be disclosed are found in Schedule 13D, id. § 240.13d-101. Items required include the
name and address of the issuer; the title of the securities; identity and background material;
source and amount of funds or other consideration; purpose of the transaction; interest of the
issuer in the securities; contracts, arrangements or understandings with respect to the securities;
and persons employed or to be compensated in connection with the issue.
86. Id. § 240.13d-101, Item 4 (emphasis added). See also Griffin & Tucker, supra note 84,
at 672.
87. Bromberg, supra note 83, at 499. As to detail, Bromberg suggests a test of "material-
ity." Nonetheless, he suggests the use of hedges by reference "not only to present knowledge
and intention, but also to future investigation, changing situations and needs, and perhaps to
the best interests of the target corporation and its shareholders as they appear in the light of
future examination and developments." Id.
88. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
89. In response to the respondents' argument that rule lOb-5 did not extend to misrepresen-
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Two subsequent circuit cases have examined this issue in greater
detail. In Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,"
complex litigation arose out of a successful cash tender offer for
shares of a volatile electronics firm. The offeror's statement filed with
the SEC declared that it might "give consideration" to a merger if
the offer were successful. Finding that the offeror had neither com-
mitted itself nor "evidenced a firm intention" to merge, the Second
Circuit held the statement to be an accurate and sufficient statement
of plans.9 The holding is thus squarely in line with Judge Weinstein's
Leasco rationale-that "preliminary contingency planning" is not
sufficiently material to be required in a 1933. Act registration state-
ment. It should be noted, however, that the Electronic Specialty deci-
sion draws a narrow line upon which issuers must balance the degree
of detail to be disclosed. In his decision, Judge Friendly wrote: "It
would be as serious an infringement of these regulations to overstate
the definiteness of the plans as to understate them. '92
Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co.,93 also illus-
trated the divergence between the circuits and the SEC on construc-
tion of the disclosure requirements. Pan American, the target, sued
tations in the proxy setting, the Court concluded that the section 14 regulatory scheme would
not affect the scope of lOb-5. "The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual
nor unfortunate." 393 U.S. at 468.
The potential conflict over whether rule 10b-5 extends full protection to security holders in
both cash tender and exchange offers was one of the motivating forces behind passage of the
Williams Act. One concern was clearly whether there was a duty to disclose imposed by rule
lOb-5 on tender offerors without access to material inside information concerning the target.
See, e.g., Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
317 (1967). The section 14(e) antifraud remedy fills whatever "gaps" existed under the lOb-5
remedy, although plaintiffs, as in Leasco, continue to allege violations of both sections. See,
e.g., Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
90. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), affg in part and rev'g in part, 295 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); see also Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 296 F. Supp. 462
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (in litigation arising out of the same transaction, Judge McLean refused to
enjoin the tender offer). The more significant aspect of the case dealt with alleged violations of
section 14(e); the Second Circuit reversed the district court's findings of misrepresentation and
the injunction based thereon.
91. 409 F.2d at 948-49. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied a functional test of
materiality tailored to the tender offer setting. See note 92 and accompanying text. The test,
"whether 'any of the stockholders who tendered their shares would probably not have tendered
their shares' if the alleged violations had not occurred," had been applied previously in similar
situations. 409 F.2d at 948, citing Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d
840, 843 (2d Cir. 1967); and General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 161-62
(2d Cir. 1968).
92. 409 F.2d at 948.
93. 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Susquehanna, the successful offeror, for alleged violation of the dis-
closure and antifraud provisions. The Fifth Circuit overruled the dis-
trict court's finding of a material omission in Susquehanna's failure
to disclose its intent to gain control of Pan American's board and to
merge the target into another corporation once control was acquired.
The court found that a reasonable shareholder would realize that
Susquehanna "intended to exercise strong control" of the target. 4
Furthermore, since such plans were expressly repudiated two days
after their suggestion, any concrete proposal of merger "never got off
the ground. '9 5 The most instructive portion of the transaction,
though, was the "hedge" clause which Susquehanna appended to its
denial of any merger plans9" and which illustrates the degree of equiv-
ocation necessary to walk the "tortuous path" of disclosure in ex-
change offers. It is equally illustrative of the manner in which courts
have weakened the disclosure underpinnings of the most essential and
most controversial requirement of the Williams Act-that relating to
"plans or proposals."
Due Diligence-Directors. As noted above, the most significant
impact of BarChris is its exhaustive application of the "due dili-
gence" defenses of section 1 (b) of the 1933 Act.9 The court held that
all director defendants-five insiders (executive officers), two outsi-
ders (a banker and a civil engineer) and two specialists (the attorney-
director and the underwriter-director)-failed to establish their de-
fense that, as to the non-expertised portions of the registration state-
ment, they had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable grounds to
believe that there were no material omissions or misrepresentations.
In applying the standards of care, BarChris appeared to adopt a
flexible approach which recognized that the standard necessarily
must vary with the parties to which it is applied.
The task of applying the standard to the Leasco defendants was
less burdensome than in BarChris, since only three Leasco directors
were named-its chief executive officer, president, and general coun-
sel. Conspicuously absent from this group was a Leasco director
94. Id. at 1083.
95. Id. at 1085. This holding obviously gave little weight to the fact that subsequent merger
into another subsidiary was proposed immediately after the successful close of the offer.
96. After expressly denying any plans to merge, Susquehanna included the following:
However, if, at some subsequent time, it should appear the interests of the Pan American
stockholders would be better served by any of the foregoing courses of action, Susque-
hanna may propose or adopt such course. Id. at 1082.
97. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
98. 332 F. Supp. at 577-78. See Comment, 68 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 15, at 1419-20.
1040 [Vol. 1972:1023
EXCHANGE OFFERS
whose primary occupation was that of partner in White, Weld & Co.,
one of the Leasco underwriters exonerated in the case. Relying upon
BarChris, Judge Weinstein concluded that an application of the rea-
sonable investigation test to director defendants was essentially a
question of independent verification by reference to readily available
written corporate documents, as opposed to reliance upon oral repre-
sentations of concededly interested insiders.9" By developing an appl-
icable standard of investigation by verification, Leasco then amplifies
the implicit functional development in BarChris. Reasonable investi-
gation will therefore "vary with the degree of involvement of the
individual, his expertise, and his access to the pertinent information
and data."99 Such an analysis modifies the strict "prudent man" test
of section 11(c) and substitutes a subjective examination of each
individual director, despite Judge Weinstein's qualification of his
standard as that of a "reasonably prudent man in that position."'' 0
Therefore, inside directors are held to a higher standard than outsi-
ders not because of their corporate status or apparent authority, but
because of their more intimate knowledge of the corporation's affairs
and their access to material information. In fact, Judge Weinstein
agrees with one leading scholar that the standard is so stringent with
respect to inside directors that "liability will lie in practically all cases
of misrepresentation."'' 0
Applying this standard to the Leasco directors, 1 2 the determining
factor was simply whether the defendants had enough information
available to them to render the estimate of surplus surplus sufficiently
accurate when accompanied by a skillfully drafted "qualifying" state-
99. 332 F. Supp. at 577. The court cited with approval a commentator who argues that
this reasoning is supported by the legislative history of the Act: "The House report. . . stated
that the duty of care to disclose varied in its demands upon the participants with the importance
of their places in the scheme of distribution and the degree of protection that the public had a
right to expect from them." 332 F. Supp. at 578, quoting Comment, 68 COLUM. L. REV., supra
note 15, at 1416.
100. 332 F. Supp. at 578 (emphasis added). For a statement of the "prudent man" test,
see note 17.
101. 332 F. Supp. at 578, citing Folk 25. Such a conclusion leads inevitably to an imposition
of "guarantor" status upon inside directors. Folk at 25.
102. The court could have rejected the defendants' unavailability argument under the ex-
press requirements of rule 409:
(b) The registrant shall include a statement either showing that unreasonable effort
or expense would be involved or indicating the absence of any affiliation with the person
within whose knowledge the information rests and stating the result of a request made
to such person for the information. 17 C.F.R. § 230.409(b) (1972).
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ment.03 Judge Weinstein rejected the contention that such an esti-
mate was impossible without adequate data from Reliance, finding
critical the knowledge of the three inside directors that a truce had
been reached with Reliance by August 1. After that time, Roberts,
president of Reliance, would have cooperated in supplying the essen-
tial information. 04 Although the court found that the defendants'
lack of a reasonable ground to believe in the accuracy of the state-
ment was a sufficient ground for liability, the court further held, in
the alternative, that the defendants failed in their duty to reasonably
investigate the accuracy of the registration statement-that is, they
had a duty to attempt to estimate surplus surplus even if they fairly
believed that effort to be futile.' This broadening of the "reasonable
investigation" test to encompass independent verification of manage-
ment's own conclusions and data comports squarely with the court's
stringent "guarantor" standard of insider liability. It also raises the
spectre that, in some cases, director good faith belief standing alone
will not be adequate. Leasco thus must be viewed as a refinement of
BarChris. In BarChris, each of the inside directors had actual knowl-
edge of the misrepresentations for which they were held liable,
whereas in Leasco liability rested upon a failure to attempt to reach
that plateau of awareness.
Leasco's discussion of the liability of each of the three directors
is less detailed than that seen in BarChris. However, Judge Wein-
stein's opinion is valuable in at least two respects. First, its very
cursory discussion of Leasco's chief executive officer and its president
supports the observation of one commentator that
an inside director who either as an officer or in some other capacity, has
intimate familiarity with the corporate affairs or handles major transactions,
especially those as to which false statements or omissions appear in the pros-
pectus, is least able to establish due diligence.'
103. Several months later, Leasco did include such a qualified estimate in a separate
registration statement. 332 F. Supp. at 560.
104. The court also rejected the argument that necessary access to the Insurance Commis-
sion's cooperation was unavailable since Roberts could have furnished that as well. Id. at 580.
105. Although concededly the court's rendering of the standard may differ from that of
section I l(b)(3) only semantically, it is nonetheless instructive in its apparent requirement of
verification by a third party:
Surplus surplus was a crucial element of the plan to acquire Reliance. Yet, no one
connected with Leasco commissioned an estimate by an insurance consultant; no one
asked any Leasco employee to calculate it; Hodes [the Leasco attorney-director] never
ordered one of his law firm's associates to attempt to arrive at a figure; and certainly





Second, in contrast to BarChris, the attorney-director in Leasco was
held to be an insider, based upon his service as a director for over
three years and his intimate involvement in the registration process. 107
This result is potentially devastating, for as an "insider" he may be
held to be as "presumptively knowledgeable"' ' s as a guarantor. In
BarChris, the "outside" attorney was held liable only for failure to
independently verify information which would command his profes-
sional attention. The "inside" Leasco attorney was subjected to the
same broader duty of investigation as other management-directors,
although the duty was still subjectively qualified by his functional
capacity and the extent of his familiarity with the affairs of the corpo-
ration. 0 19 If nothing else, then, Leasco counsels added caution in the
endogamous relations between corporations and their retained legal
counsel.
Due Diligence- Underwriters. The Securities Act subjects under-
writers to the same duty of due care as directors and signers of the
registration statement but affords them the same defenses and a free-
dom from unlimited liability."0 Because of the underwriter's unique
position in the securities offering scheme, one commentator has sug-
gested that the underwriter be subject to a standard of integrity ex-
ceeded only by that of the issuer."' In BarChris, Judge McLean held
that the underwriter's publicly owed responsibility for the "truth of
the prospectus""' precluded satisfaction of the reasonable investiga-
tion duty by the mere acceptance and accurate reporting of data
107. 332 F. Supp. at 575-76.
108. Folk 35.
109. Although this distinction may suffice conceptually, there are difficulties in distinguish-
ing the positions of the two attorneys. Aside from a shorter tenure as a director, the BarChris
attorney appears to have been as fully involved in the registration process as the Leasco
attorney, whose activities are not chronicled beyond his involvement in the takeover bid.
Compare 283 F. Supp. at 689-92 with 332 F. Supp. at 575-76.
110. Securities Act of 1933, § 11 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). A special limit on liability is
afforded by section l I(e) to underwriters: the total price at which the securities underwritten
by him and distributed to the public were offered to the public. Id. § 77k(e). See generally
Comment, 1969 DUKE L.J., supra note 15.
I ll. Professor Folk suggests a number of reasons for this conclusion: the fact that the
underwriter's reputation is imputed to the issuer; that he is in a more objective position conduc-
ive to aggressive investigation of issuer representations; and that the underwriter has substantial
control over final acceptance of the issue. In fact, self interest-the awareness of his liabil-
ity-should accelerate the adoption of that role. Folk 54-55.
112. 283 F. Supp. at 697. Underwriters thus occupy a fiduciary position vis-a-vis the public
and the issuer. "In a sense, the positions of the underwriter and the company's officers are
adverse." Id. at 696.
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presented to him by management.13 Judge Weinstein, in Leasco,
gave full credence to the BarChris standard but, at the same time,
emphasized the underwriter's "more limited access" to inside knowl-
edge of corporate affairs."' Such a qualification of the BarChris
standard is unobjectionable on its face as a functional approach to
securities regulation. As applied in Leasco, however, the court's con-
clusion poses a serious challenge to the disclosure philosophy as man-
dated in BarChris.
In Leasco, the directors were held liable for their failure to rea-
sonably investigate and for their failure to estimate the omitted ap-
proximation of surplus surplus. That holding turned principally upon
the court's conclusion that the August 1 rapprochement with Reli-
ance made available sufficient data and expertise to make such an
estimate."' However, the underwriters were held to have "just
barely" established their reasonable investigation and belief that the
omission was justified."' Their apparently intense examination of
Leasco's documents and financial data seems to have been virtually
beyond reproach; nor, absent one crucial fact, could they be faulted
for assuming that the surplus surplus estimate was unavailable since
they were initially advised of the Reliance hostility and refusal to
cooperate in the preparation of the registration statement, and were
aware of the lawsuit filed against Leasco and of Roberts' unfavorable
letter to his shareholders. This state of knowledge, absent awareness
of the August 1 agreement with the Reliance board, would have
supported the reasonable investigation defense. Although the court
expressly found that the underwriters were aware of the agreement,
it nevertheless exonerated them on the tenuous ground that they were
never "disabused" of their belief that Roberts remained uncoopera-
tive."' The court's conclusion rested upon an August 13 letter from
Leasco's counsel to the SEC (with copies to the underwriters) that
113. "They may not rely solely on the company's officers or on the company's counsel."
Id. at 697. Reasonable investigation thus demands an independent verification through avail-
able information. See Comment, 68 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 15, at 1417-22.
114. 332 F. Supp. at 582. One must concede the impracticability, as does Judge McLean,
283 F. Supp. at 691, of a "rigid rule" requiring "the most detailed, independent verification
possible of every material representation in the prospectus." Comment, 1969 DuKE L.J., sipra
note 15, at 1200-01. Rather, the standard, as with "materiality," must vary with the facts of
each case.
115. See text accompanying notes 102-05 supra.
116. 332 F. Supp. at 582.
117. Id. at 583.
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Reliance had "declined to furnish information."'' 8 Judge Weinstein
held that the underwriters had "reasonably verified Leasco's repre-
sentations" of unavailability. Such a conclusion is unacceptable.
BarChris expressly precludes underwriter acceptance of management
representations at face value; instead, it requires independent verifi-
cation. Here, the underwriters, clearly aware of the ramifications of
the August I agreement, should not have accepted Leasco's represen-
tation that Roberts remained uncooperative without independently
verifying that assertion."9 Since they did not contact Roberts in the
nineteen days between the agreement and the effective date of the
offer, they should be held to the same liability imposed upon the
directors who were deemed to have a duty to re-assess the availability
of the data after August 1. Further, since a member of the underwrit-
ing firm was also on the Leasco board, it is at least arguable that his
knowledge of the August 1 agreement should have been imputed to
his underwriting firm.2 0 When his loyalty to the corporation conflicts
with his duty to the public, the proper course of action for the
underwriter-director is clear-the public interest must prevail. In the
words of one leading commentator: "[S]anctions to compel careful
scrutiny by underwriters must be sustained intact."'' Hence, the
underwriter-director is held to a high standard. Whether the policy
behind that standard compels affirmative disclosure to his firm or
even imputation of his knowledge has not yet been settled. 2
118. Id.
119. Professor Folk's analysis of BarChris supports such a conclusion:
Probably the rule emerging from BarChris is that sole reliance by underwriters on
representations by officers is presumptively insufficient; ordinarily, . . . the underwriter
should verify specific facts as fully as possible, or be prepared to prove that his best
efforts were thwarted by events he could not control. Folk 72.
120. If sued as an individual, his liability would have been clear, since his position would
directly parallel the position occupied by Coleman, an underwriter-director, in BarChris. Al-
though Coleman was personally responsible for the investigation, 283 F. Supp. at 693, the role
performed by the underwriter-director in Leasco is unclear.
121. Folk 39.
122. Extended discussion of this imputation theory is beyond the scope of this Note. How-
ever, in concluding, one might further speculate that the "deputization" theory applied to
certain directors sitting on the boards of more than one corporation in "short-swing" profits
violations might be indirectly applicable in imputing the knowledge of Leasco to White, Weld
& Co. Cf. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969).
The theory of deputization in section 16(b) cases, based as it is on the statutory purpose of
precluding the use of inside information for trading in the company's own stock, is arguably
not applicable to a failure to disclose in the registration setting. Nonetheless, the failure to




Measure of Damages. Judge Weinstein's application of the sec-
tion 1 (e) damage formula in Leasco is highly significant for a num-
ber of reasons. It is only the second major decision to give credence
to the defendant's causation defense, and the first to apply it to a
post-Williams Act tender offer.' Furthermore, the decision illus-
trates the difficulties arising from the present bifurcated securities
scheme which forces the court to foreclose one measure of damages
in its choice among the civil enforcement sections of both Acts.
Leasco's greatest impact, however, probably will ensue from its ex-
plicit recognition of market decline and its use of a measurable indi-
cator in the damage formula. Section 11 (e) allows the defendant to
prove that part of the loss "represents other than the depreciation in
value of such securities resulting from" the material omission or
misrepresentation.'? This "causation with a reverse twist"'2 5 has been
viewed as imposing a heavy burden upon the defendant, for even
assuming that a portion of the damages is attributable to conditions
unrelated to the misrepresentation, any measure of exact proof
thereof seems difficult. 2 This problem frustrated defendants until
1966, when limited vitality was breathed into the causation defense
in Fox v. Glickman Corp., ' 2  which reports a settlement agreement
arising out of a suit based upon misrepresentations in three registra-
tion statements. Under the second statement, the offering price of
$12.50 declined to $11.125 over a nine month period ending on the
date of first public awareness of the corporation's "difficulties."'2
123. The BarChris decision did not reach this issue. See text following note 27 supra.
Although Judge McLean rejected the defendants' contention that the entire amount of damages
was due to the decline in the bowling industry, he deferred any decision on whether the causa-
tion defense was valid as to some plaintiffs. 283 F. Supp. at 703-04.
124. Section I I(e) authorizes recovery of such damages:
as shall represent the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding
the price at which the security was offered to the public) and (1) the value thereof as of
the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall have been
disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at which such security shall have
been disposed of after suit but before judgment if such damages shall be less than the
damages representing the difference between the amount paid for the security (not
exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public) and the value thereof
as of the time such suit was brought . . . . 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
125. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1728 (1961).
126. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 29, at 809-10. Professors Jennings and Marsh
doubt the feasibility of proof even if the market were to have declined before discovery of the
false statement. This pessimistic view was refuted in the Fox case.
127. 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
128. Id. at 1010. This terminology is ambiguous; presumably the court refers to the initial
discovery of the falsehood such that subsequent decline is attributable thereto.
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This decline, the court held, could not be attributed to the misrepre-
sentation but rather was due to other market conditions and thus the
maximum recovery was set at $11.125.129 Similarly, a minimum val-
uation was established at the value of the stock on the statutory cut-
off date;' any decline in value after that date was deemed not to
be due to deficiencies in the statement.
Judge Weinstein's decision in Leasco surpassed this limited,
though precedential, application of the causation defense in Fox by
including the effect of market decline forces throughout the entire
exchange offer period, regardless of the date of public "discovery"
of the alleged misrepresentation. The court thus took judicial notice
of the drastic decline in market prices during 1969.131 Since the court
concluded that some portion of the decline in the price of Leasco
shares was due to market factors affecting all stocks, it held that a
part of the plaintiffs' damages was not caused by the disclosure defi-
ciencies . 3  The major deterrent to such an approach has been the
difficulty in applying a sufficiently definite adjustment factor to the
specific stock. To overcome this obstacle, Judge Weinstein used a
novel formula adapting therein the broad-based Standard and Poor's
Daily Stock Price Index. By multiplying the amount paid for the
security (the Reliance common price) by the reciprocal of the decline
in the Standard and Poor's Index from August 16, 1968 to the date
of sale by a given plaintiff, the diminution in value due solely to
market decline would be extracted from the damage award.1 3
Judge Weinstein's formula is a praiseworthy attempt to effectuate
the heretofore frustrated congressional intent to limit recovery to
loss resulting from the material omission or misrepresentation. In
declining markets, prior defendants have been assessed damages rep-
resenting, in part, the decline in-value due to non-actionable causes,
129. Id.
130. Pursuant to section 1 l(a), Glickman had published and distributed an earnings state-
ment covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective date. The court
accepted this date as a cut-off because of the publication of the report in the New York financial
papers and because Glickman's difficulties were public knowledge by that time.
131. 332 F. Supp. at 586. During the relevant exchange offer period-August 16, 1968 (the
last day of trading unaffected by news of the offer) to October 27, 1969 (the date suit was
filed)-the Standard & Poor's Index rose from 98.68 to a high of 109 and then fell to 97.97,
while the Dow Jones Index rose from 917 to 996 and then plummeted to 860.28.
132. Id.
133. The Leasco formula is complicated by valuation difficulties as to the warrant-preferred
stock package and by a five-for-two split of the warrants. The decision includes a useful
example of the formula's application. Id. at 588.
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although, in fairness, defendants have probably been equally compen-
sated in rising markets where actionable price declines have been
driven up by general market enthusiasm.'34 The formula is subject
to attack on the grounds of the irrelevancy of general market trends
to the specific decline of the defendants' stock. Possibly it should be
refined by limiting the examination of market decline to the perform-
ance of a composite of related stock-for example, fire and casualty
insurers or electronic data processing corporations. Nevertheless, the
Leasco formula should be regarded as a highly significant develop-
ment in federal securities law and its application will surely be urged
by Securities Act defendants.
Damage resolution in the Leasco situation is complicated by the
evident incongruity in applying the section 1 (e) formula to an ex-
change offer setting. Thus, in determining the "amount paid" for the
security (the Leasco Package), the court was forced to choose be-
tween the combined market value of the Leasco preferred and war-
rants and the market value of Reliance shares to be exchanged. Since
the former measure was the amount received and since it included the
inducement premium, the court rejected the combined market value
of the Leasco securities as a measure of the amount paid. Instead, it
chose as the price paid the open market value of Reliance shares on
the last date of trading before the effective date of the offer. 3 Since
there was thus a separate "amount paid" figure for each individual
exchange, the court's resolution ignores the fluctuation in market
values of each of the three securities involved during the exchange
period. This sacrifice of precision was necessitated by the court's
limitation of damages to those provided in section 11. It rejected
three alternative damage formulas which would have imposed liabil-
ity under the more flexible antifraud provisions. 3 Again, the lack
of uniformity in the federal securities scheme precluded a potentially
greater and possibly more equitable recovery. The same conduct,
arguably actionable under several of the civil liability sections of the
134. By analogy, one might surmise whether future plaintiffs might not argue that, when
faced with a rising market, their loss would have been greater had not the price decline of the
stock (or failure to decline) been held up by general market advances. Such a plaintiff, though,
has no realized "damages" for that portion of the "decline," nor is there an analogue to the
causation defense expressly granted to plaintiffs.
135. 332 F. Supp. at 585-86.
136. Id. at 584-85. Plaintiffs suggested the following formulas: (1) a conversion formula,




two acts, should not produce different recoveries varying with the
court's inclinations toward the liability sections. Judge Weinstein
would undoubtedly have faced this greater dilemma had Roberts,
who purposely avoided signing the registration statement to evade
liability thereunder, been sued under rule lOb-5 for the breach of
fiduciary duty evident in the August 1 sell-out to Leasco.
CONCLUSION
The chief goal of securities regulation is "full and fair disclosure"
of all material facts. Judicial attempts to reach that goal are beset
with difficulties, however. Materiality is more easily required than
defined, and the responsibility of the various parties to a securities
transaction for the accuracy of the information disclosed remains
unclear. A further complication is introduced by the damage provi-
sions of section 11 of the 1933 Act. Since that section permits recov-
ery only of damages caused by the fraudulent acts of defendants, any
award should take into account the fact that securities prices fluc-
tuate constantly within a changing market.
Judge Weinstein's decision in Leasco illustrates the limitations of
judicial attempts to apply the standards of the securities acts in a
specific fact situation. His discussion of materiality demonstrates the
weaknesses inherent in the traditional tests, but his proposed applica-
tion of sampling techniques and mathematical models to define
materiality in a given case creates as many problems as it solves and
may be poorly suited for the courtroom. Further, his damage formula
is arguably irrelevant to the extent that a particular security shows
fluctuations in value which depart from market averages. Leasco,
then, is at best an imperfect answer to the questions raised by the
securities acts. By attempting to find new ways to solve old problems,
Judge Weinstein's decision underscores their existence.
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